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iQUESTION PRESENTED
Whether an objectively incorrect statement of opinion 
is actionable under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. § 77k, only if it was subjectively disbelieved by 
the defendant.
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1INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici are legal scholars who write and teach about 
the common law as it bears on issues of current regulation, 
including issues of misrepresentation and false opinions.1 
They include scholars in the fi elds of contracts, torts, 
criminal law, remedies, consumer law, and securities 
regulation. Samuel W. Buell is Professor of Law at Duke 
Law School, where his research and teaching focus on 
criminal law and regulation of corporations and fi nancial 
markets. James D. Cox is the Brainerd Currie Professor 
of Law at Duke Law School, where he teaches and writes 
about corporate and securities law. Deborah DeMott is the 
David F. Cavers Professor of Law at Duke Law School, 
where her teaching and scholarship focus on tort and 
corporate law and the law of agency. She also served as 
reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Agency, published 
in 2006. Christopher L. Griffi n, Jr., is Assistant Professor 
of Law at William & Mary Law School, where he teaches 
and writes about torts and the law of remedies. Ann M. 
Lipton is a Visiting Assistant Professor at Duke Law 
School, where she teaches and writes about securities 
litigation. Lauren E. Willis is Professor of Law at Loyola 
Law School Los Angeles, where she teaches and writes 
about consumer law and contracts. She is also an Adviser 
to the Restatement (Third) of Consumer Contracts. 
1.  This brief has been fi led with the written consent of the 
parties, which fi led blanket consents with the Clerk of Court. 
Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici affi rms that no counsel for 
a party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person 
or entity, other than amici or their counsel, make a monetary 
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.
2SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The core of Petitioners’ position is that “[t]he only ‘fact’ 
conveyed by a statement of opinion or belief is the fact that 
the speaker held the stated belief. It naturally follows that 
such a statement can be ‘untrue’ as to a ‘material fact’ 
only if the speaker did not actually hold the stated belief.” 
Petitioners’ Brief at 11. That is not, however, what this 
Court said in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 
U.S. 1083 (1990); it is not even the position taken by the 
Second and Ninth Circuits. Even those courts that have 
read Virginia Bankshares as requiring both subjective 
and objective falsity have nonetheless presupposed that 
an opinion statement may be objectively false. 
That is also the clear position of the common law, 
both as it existed at the time the Securities Act was 
drafted and today. Across a variety of fi elds—from the 
torts of misrepresentation and defamation to rules of 
contract and restitution—the common law acknowledges 
that opinion statements may be objectively false if they 
imply underlying facts, and that they may be actionable if 
made by a person who stands in a relation of trust to the 
recipient, purports to be an expert, or has special access 
to facts. The circumstances in which opinion statements 
triggers liability at common law tracks the circumstances 
involved in securities litigation under § 11 of the 1933 Act, 
and the Act is best read as incorporating those exceptions.
Petitioners’ position is particularly untenable with 
respect to statements of law. Petitioners maintain that 
“[a]n assertion of legal compliance cannot be defi nitively 
true or false at the time it is made except in the rare 
case in which a court has already definitively ruled 
3on the legality of the issuer’s actions.” Petitioners’ 
Brief at 34-35. This extraordinary position seems to 
question the very notion of a rule of law. The common 
law, however, is far more nuanced. It recognizes that 
many statements on legal matters imply the existence 
of underlying facts, such that the legal statements can 
be actionable as misrepresentations if those facts do not 
exist. It also acknowledges that lawyers frequently have 
more information and expertise than the recipients of 
statements about the law, and that they frequently stand 
in a relation of trust to those recipients. Moreover, the law 
has frequently had to confront legal uncertainty on some 
points, and in many areas—including qualifi ed immunity, 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and habeas corpus—it has developed 
effective tools to separate opinions about legitimately 
uncertain legal questions from legal judgments that are 
simply and objectively wrong. As with opinion statements 
generally, the circumstances of a securities registration 
statement under the 1933 Act fi t particularly well with the 
situations in which the common law makes legal judgments 
potentially actionable.
ARGUMENT
I. The common law provides both the background 
against which Congress legislated in the Securities 
Act of 1933 and contemporary insight into the 
general question of opinion falsity.
This brief focuses on common law principles 
concerning misrepresentations and opinions, including 
the special case of opinions about the law. The common 
law is relevant in two distinct senses. When Congress 
enacted the Securities Act in 1933, it legislated against a 
4common law background that informed the content of the 
Act and continues to provide insight into what Congress 
had in mind. The common law and federal securities law 
also continue to share certain basic questions, and the 
resolution of those questions in one area may shed light 
as to how to proceed in the other.
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes liability 
based on a registration statement’s inclusion of an “untrue 
statement of a material fact or omi[ssion] to state a 
material fact . . . necessary to make the statements therein 
not misleading.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Congress enacted this 
provision against the background of the common law of 
misrepresentation and deceit. See, e.g., 7 Louis Loss, Joel 
Seligman, & Troy Paredes, Securities Regulation 426, 
434 (4th ed. 2012). To be sure, “the courts have repeatedly 
held that the fraud provisions in the SEC Acts . . . are 
not limited to circumstances that would give rise to a 
common law action for deceit.” Id. at 435. As then-Judge 
Alito stated, “[i]t is well known that the federal securities 
laws provide broader fraud protection than the common 
law, having been enacted in response to the common law’s 
perceived failure at stamping out fraud in the securities 
markets.” MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 
204, 218 (3d Cir. 2005). Nonetheless, “conceptions familiar 
in the common law are retained” in § 11, including the 
need to identify “a matter of ‘fact’ as distinguished . . . 
from one of ‘opinion.’” Harry Shulman, Civil Liability 
and the Securities Act, 43 Yale L. J. 227, 249 (1933). How 
the common law treated that question—and in particular, 
how it dealt with the sort of circumstances that arise in 
the context of a securities offering—is instructive as to 
what Congress intended in the 1933 Act. And because 
Congress intended to supplement common law liability, 
“it seems reasonable to assume at the very least that the 
5most liberal common law views on these questions should 
govern under the statutes.” Loss, et al., supra, at 434.
The common law is also relevant in a second sense. As 
a leading treatise says, “[i]t is obvious from the language 
[of the SEC statutes] that some of the basic problems are 
the same—what is false, what is a fact, what is material.” 
Loss, et al., supra, at 434. This case concerns what is 
false. As Petitioners assert, that is a question under all 
the federal securities laws—under § 11 of the 1933 Act 
as well as under the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act 
and SEC Rule 10b-5. But the same question has required 
an answer under the common law of torts, contracts, and 
restitution. The interaction of the First Amendment with 
the common law of defamation, for instance, has forced 
courts to distinguish particularly carefully between what 
is a falsifi able fact and what is a non-falsifi able opinion. 
For this latter reason, it is useful to consider not only 
the common law as it appeared to Congress in 1933, but 
also contemporary principles and decisions that may shed 
light on the parallel problems posed by the securities laws. 
We have accordingly cited decisions and commentary that 
postdate the 1933 Act alongside materials that would 
have been available to the Act’s drafters. In any event, 
the law displays considerable consistency over time on the 
principles relevant to this case. 
II. Under the common law and this Court’s decision 
in Virginia Bankshares, opinions may be both 
subjectively and objectively false.
The common law rule, refl ected across the spectrum 
of tort, contract, and related fi elds, is that “a claim for 
misrepresentation lies only for misrepresentation of a 
6fact.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 477, at 1364 
(2001). But although this rule “is often broadly stated 
. . . in fact courts recognize a number of undermining 
exceptions”; hence, “liability may be imposed for false 
and material misrepresentations of opinion when the 
defendant is a fi duciary, when he is a disinterested person 
or an expert upon whom the plaintiff can justifi ably rely, 
when he has special knowledge, and when the opinion 
implies material facts.” Id. at 1365. These exceptions 
presuppose that opinion statements may be objectively—
as well as subjectively—false. And they track quite 
well the circumstances that actually exist in securities 
transactions. In fact, it makes sense to think of § 11 as 
codifying not the general rule but rather the exceptions 
that the common law always recognized for statements of 
opinion from fi duciaries who possess special expertise and 
knowledge of the facts, and whose conclusions frequently 
imply the existence of such facts. 
A. Virginia Bankshares and the Courts of Appeals 
requiring subjective falsity presuppose that 
opinions may be objectively false.
This Court rejected the core of Petitioners’ position in 
Virginia Bankshares when it observed that “statements 
of reasons or belief . . . are factual in two senses: as 
statements that the directors do act for the reasons given 
or hold the belief stated and as statements about the 
subject matter of the reason or belief expressed.” 501 U.S. 
at 1092. Much as Petitioners argue here, the defendants in 
Virginia Bankshares argued that opinion statements—
such as the claim that the merger price was “high” or its 
terms were “fair”—are too “indefi nite and unverifi able” 
to be capable of falsifi cation. Id. at 1093. But the Court 
rejected that argument:
7The objection ignores the fact that such 
conclusory terms in a commercial context are 
reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis 
that justifi es them as accurate, the absence 
of which renders them misleading. Provable 
facts either furnish good reasons to make a 
conclusory commercial judgment, or they count 
against it, and expressions of such judgments 
can be uttered with knowledge of truth or 
falsity just like more defi nite statements, and 
defended or attacked through the orthodox 
evidentiary process that either substantiates 
their underlying justifications or tends to 
disprove their existence.
Id. Immediately following this passage, the Court cited 
Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), a common 
law misrepresentation decision turning not on subjective 
falsity, but rather on doctrines that recipients of opinion 
statements may, in certain circumstances, rely on those 
statements as representations of underlying facts. See id. 
at 1026-27. And the Virginia Bankshares Court concluded 
that “[i]n this case, whether $42 was ‘high,’ and the 
proposal ‘fair’ to the minority shareholders, depended on 
whether provable facts about the Bank’s assets, and about 
actual and potential levels of operation, substantiated a 
value that was above, below, or more or less at the $42 
fi gure, when assessed in accordance with recognized 
methods of valuation.” 501 U.S. at 1094. 
It is thus simply wrong to attribute to Virginia 
Bankshares the view that “[b]ecause a statement of 
opinion ‘by definition’ is a statement about what the 
speaker believes, the jury could have found the statements 
8at issue to be false as to a ‘material fact’ only insofar as the 
statements falsely conveyed the directors’ actual opinion.” 
Petitioners’ Brief at 17 (citing Virginia Bankshares, 501 
U.S. at 1090). This Court clearly did not view opinion 
statements as only falsifi able in a single sense (subjective 
falsity). Rather, the Court said that such statements “are 
factual in two senses.” 501 U.S. at 1092 (emphasis added). 
Justice Scalia confi rmed this understanding when he 
read the Court’s opinion to require both subjective and 
objective falsity. Id. at 1109 (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and in the judgment). Amici do not agree with Justice 
Scalia’s reading on that point, but for present purposes 
the critical point is that any notion that both subjective and 
objective falsity are required presupposes that, even for 
opinion statements, both subjective and objective falsity 
are possible. 
By denying that objective falsity is even possible, 
Petitioners have cast themselves adrift from the courts 
of appeals whose reasoning they purport to defend. The 
Second Circuit explained in Fait v. Regions Financial 
Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2011), that “[r]equiring 
plaintiffs to allege a speaker’s disbelief in, and the falsity 
of, the opinions or beliefs expressed ensures that their 
allegations concern the factual components of those 
statements” (emphasis added); see also Rubke v. Capitol 
Bancorp, Ltd., 551 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that opinion statements support a § 11 claim only if “the 
statements were both objectively and subjectively false or 
misleading”) (emphasis added). Petitioners’ position seems 
to be that opinion statements can only be subjectively 
false, but no court has adopted that view. 
9B. The common law of tort likewise treats 
opinions as objectively false and therefore 
actionable in a variety of situations.
Virginia Bankshares’s holding that opinion statements 
may be objectively false rested fi rmly on the common 
law. The common law deals with misrepresentations and 
statements of opinion in a number of different areas, 
including not only the tort of misrepresentation or deceit 
but also the tort of defamation and the law of contract and 
restitution. The Securities Act was enacted to go beyond the 
common law standards of liability for misrepresentations. 
Nonetheless, as Virginia Bankshares’s reliance on Day 
v. Avery attests, the common law sets an important 
baseline. As to false statements of opinion, the 1933 Act 
embodies—at a minimum—the particular application 
of well-established common law doctrine to the context 
of a registration statement issued to purchasers in the 
securities markets.
The common law plainly recognized that statements 
of opinion may be false in a number of ways. Day v. 
Avery recognized that an opinion statement “ordinarily 
would not be a suffi cient predicate for [a tort action for 
misrepresentation] as between parties truly dealing at 
arms’ length.” 548 F.2d at 1025-26.2 The court noted a 
number of exceptions, however, based on “circumstances 
that would lead the reasonable person to believe that 
implicit in the prediction or opinion is an assertion of fact 
2.  See also Sydney Edward Williams, Kerr on Fraud and 
Mistake 53 (1929) (“A representation, to be material, should be 
in respect of an ascertainable fact, as distinguished from a mere 
matter of opinion.”).
10
upon which the recipient . . . might prudently rely.” Id. at 
1026. These circumstances include “[w]here the person 
making the representation occupies a fi duciary or other 
position of trust”; “where the speaker may reasonably be 
understood as having based an opinion or prediction on 
facts that are unavailable to the listener either because 
he does not have access to them or because he is obviously 
incapable of interpreting them”; and where “one who 
asserts that a future event will come to pass impliedly 
warrants that he knows of no fact that will prevent its 
occurrence.” Id. at 1026-27. 
Section 539 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
recognizes a similar rule:
(1) A statement of opinion as to facts not 
disclosed and not otherwise known to the 
recipient may, if it is reasonable to do so, be 
interpreted by him as an implied statement
(a) that the facts known to the maker 
are not incompatible with his 
opinion; or
(b) that he knows facts suffi cient to 
justify him in forming it.3
3.  See also Restatement of Torts § 539 (1938) (articulating 
a similar rule); Williams, supra, at 53 (“It is often fallaciously 
assumed that a statement of opinion cannot involve a statement 
of fact. But if the facts are not equally known to both sides, a 
statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best often 
involves a statement of a material fact, for he implicitly states that 
he knows facts which justify his opinion.”).
11
This provision confirms the second sense in which 
Virginia Bankshares  recognized an opinion may 
represent falsifi able facts—that is, as “statements about 
the subject matter of the reason or belief expressed.”4 
The commentary to this section emphasizes that opinions 
imply underlying facts “particularly when the maker is 
understood to have special knowledge of facts unknown to 
the recipient.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 539 cmt. b.5 
The distinction between fact and opinion is most 
developed in the law of defamation. At common law, 
“[t]he expression of opinion was . . . actionable in a suit 
for defamation, despite the normal requirement that 
the communication be false as well as defamatory.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. a. In Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974), this Court 
held that “[t]here is no such thing as a false idea. . . . But 
there is no constitutional value in false statements of 
fact.” That holding did not, however, result in all opinions 
being immune from defamation suits; rather, tort law 
distinguishes between “pure” and “mixed” expressions 
4.  See also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 901 
A.2d 106, 115 (Del. 2006) (“When the recipient does not know the 
facts, he may justifi ability rely upon [the] implied assertions and 
recover on the basis of a misrepresentation of implied fact.”). 
5.  The Restatement (Second) gives the example that 
“when an auditor who is known to have examined the books of a 
corporation states that it is in sound fi nancial condition, he may 
reasonably be understood to say that his examination has been 
suffi cient to permit him to form an honest opinion and that what 
he has found justifi es his conclusion. . . . [H]e is subject to liability 
if he has not made the examination, or if he has not found facts 
that justify the opinion, on the basis of his misrepresentation of 
the implied facts.” Id.
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of opinion. Pure statements of opinion occur “when the 
maker of the comment states the fact on which he bases 
his opinion of the plaintiff and then expresses a comment 
as to the plaintiff’s conduct, qualifi cations or character,” 
or when “both parties to the communication know the 
facts or assume their existence”; in each situation, “[t]he 
statement of facts and the expression of opinion based 
on them are separate matters.” Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 566 cmt. b. “Mixed” statements, on the other 
hand, occur when these conditions are not met; hence, “the 
expression of the opinion gives rise to an inference that 
there are undisclosed facts that justify the forming of the 
opinion expressed by the defendant. To say of a person 
that he is a thief without explaining why, may, depending 
on the circumstances, be found to imply the assertion 
that he has committed acts that come within the common 
connotation of thievery.” Id. 
Mixed defamatory statements of opinion are actionable, 
notwithstanding the First Amendment, because they are 
treated as including a defamatory statement of fact that, 
if false, is unprotected. See Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 566 (“A defamatory communication may consist of a 
statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of 
this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation 
of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the 
opinion.”).6 Under this rule, “[i]t is the function of the court 
to determine whether an expression of opinion is capable of 
bearing a defamatory meaning because it may reasonably 
be understood to imply the assertion of undisclosed facts 
that justify the expressed opinion about the plaintiff or 
his conduct.” Id. 
6.  See also id. cmt. c; Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 
910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977).
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The critical point is that all of these defamation 
rules focus on the opinion’s objective falsity; they thus 
stand as counter-examples to Petitioners’ extraordinary 
claim that opinions may be false only in a subjective 
sense. At common law, subjective falsity was irrelevant 
to defamation; except in peripheral cases, defamation 
was a strict liability offense. See id. § 580B cmt. b. Gertz 
held that the First Amendment requires not only that 
the defamatory statement be untrue but also that the 
defendant have some degree of fault, but aside from public 
fi gures negligence remains suffi cient. See 418 U.S. at 346-
47; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580B(c) & cmt. c. The 
defendant’s subjective belief is relevant to this question 
of fault, but “a mistaken belief in the truth of the matter 
published is not suffi cient to amount to a bar” to liability. 
Id. § 581A cmt. h. Falsity, in other words, is an objective 
question; subjective belief is relevant only to scienter.
C. The common law of contracts and restitution 
likewise permit liability even without subjective 
falsity for misrepresentations of opinion.
Although securities fraud claims generally descend 
from the common law of misrepresentation and deceit, 
tort law’s concept of fraudulent misrepresentation is not 
an ideal analog for § 11 of the Securities Act, because tort 
law requires scienter for fraudulent misrepresentation 
while § 11 does not. Contract law, by contrast, defi nes 
a “misrepresentation” simply as “an assertion not in 
accordance with the facts.” Restatement of Contracts 
§ 470(1) (1932). The commentary makes clear that “[m]
isrepresentation of itself implies neither conscious error 
nor negligence on the part of the person making the 
misrepresentation. It may be innocent or known to be 
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false.” Id. cmt. a.7 The remedy for misrepresentation 
in contract—similar to the measure of damages in § 11 
cases—is rescission and restitution.8 
The common law of contracts makes clear that 
liability for misrepresentations involving statements of 
opinion is not limited to cases of subjective falsity. The 
fi rst Restatement of Contract treats matters of opinion in 
§ 474, which says that “[a] manifestation that the person 
making has no reason to expect to be understood as 
more than an expression of his opinion . . . is not fraud 
or a material misrepresentation, unless made by (a) one 
who has, or purports to have expert knowledge of the 
matter, or (b) one whose manifestation is an intentional 
misrepresentation and varies so far from the truth that no 
reasonable man in his position could have such an opinion.” 
7.  See also id. § 471 cmt. b (“Misrepresentation without 
conscious fault, and even without negligence often has the same 
legal operation as fraud in giving the injured party a power 
of avoidance . . . .”). Fraud matters for the consequence of a 
misrepresentation; “materiality of the mistake induced by innocent 
misrepresentation is essential while materiality is not essential if a 
mistake induced by fraud produces the intended consequences.” Id. 
§ 476 cmt. b. Because § 11 of the Securities Act requires materiality 
as a separate element, misrepresentations that would otherwise 
support an action under the 1933 Act would generally entitle the 
purchaser to rescission in contract even without fraud. 
8.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 376 (“A party 
who has avoided a contract on the ground of . . . mistake [or] 
misrepresentation . . . is entitled to restitution for any benefi t that 
he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance 
or reliance.”).
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Id. § 474. This rule parallels the rule in tort, and it plainly 
does not depend on subjective falsity. 9 
Moreover, although the Restatement of Contracts 
acknowledges that “[s]tatements that things are ‘good,’ 
‘valuable,’ ‘large,’ or ‘strong,’ necessarily involve an 
exercise of individual judgment . . . the boundaries of 
quality asserted by such statements . . . cannot be stretched 
indefi nitely.” Id. § 474 cmt. c.10 Opinions are false, in other 
words, if they fall outside a zone of reasonableness. Finally, 
comment d specifi cally deals with misstatements of law. 
Although the general rule is that “[a] representation of a 
rule of law . . . is inoperative,” the Restatement recognizes 
exceptions where the statement is made by “a lawyer to 
a layman, or by a person who may be supposed to have 
expert knowledge of the special rule to one who is ignorant 
of the subject.” Id. § 474 cmt. d.
The common law of restitution is linked to that of 
contract; rescission and restitution, after all, is the remedy 
9.  See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 168 cmt. d 
(“In some circumstances the recipient may reasonably understand 
a statement of opinion to be more than an assertion as to the 
maker’s state of mind. . . . [I]f the statement of opinion relates to 
facts not known to the recipient, he may be justifi ed in inferring 
that there are facts that justify the opinion, or at least that there 
are no facts that are incompatible with it. In such a case, the 
statement of opinion becomes, in effect, an assertion as to those 
facts and may be relied on as such.”).
10.  See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 168 cmt. d 
(recognizing that market practice accommodates some degree of 
adversariness and puffery, but even in arms-length transactions, 
“the other party is entitled to assume that a statement of opinion 
is not so far removed from the truth as to be incompatible with 
the facts known to the maker”) .
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for misrepresentation in contract. Unsurprisingly, the fi rst 
Restatement of Restitution includes a similarly capacious 
concept of misrepresentation. In many circumstances, 
“there is a right to restitution because of a mistake in 
the conferring of a benefi t. The mistake may be one of 
law or of fact,” and it “may be the result of the fraud or 
innocent inducement of the other party.” Restatement 
of Restitution, Ch. 2 (“Mistake, Including Fraud”), 
Introductory Note (1937). Remedies are not, in other 
words, confined to circumstances involving scienter. 
Section 28 states a similar rule to the one in contract: 
“[a] person who has paid money to another because of a 
mistake of fact and who does not obtain what he expected 
in return is entitled to restitution from the other if the 
mistake was induced . . . by the fraud of the payee, or . 
. . by his innocent and material misrepresentation.” Id. 
§ 28 (emphasis added). Likewise, restitution is available 
in the event of a mistake of law if there is either fraud or 
“justifi able reliance upon an innocent misrepresentation.” 
Id. § 55(b).
The Restatement of Restitution generally provides 
that representations of opinions are not fraudulent or 
material, but excepts situations similar to those in the 
Restatement of Contracts: “one standing in a fi duciary or 
confi dential relation to the person to whom [the statement] 
is made”; “one who has, or purports to have, expert 
knowledge of the matter”; or “one whose manifestation is 
an intentional misrepresentation and varies so far from 
the truth that no reasonable man in his position could have 
such an opinion.” Id. §8(3).
Longstanding rules of both contract and restitution, 
in other words, make clear that subjective falsity 
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is not a prerequisite for rescissionary remedies for 
misrepresentation, even when the misrepresentation 
concerns a matter of opinion. And, as discussed in the next 
section, the circumstances in which innocent statements 
of opinion are actionable track the special obligations that 
issuers of securities have to purchasers. Even if Congress 
had meant the Securities Act only to track the common 
law—rather than impose more rigorous obligations—it 
would not have not assumed that subjective falsity is 
required.
D. Registration statements fi t the exceptions in 
which the common law imposed liability for 
opinion statements.
The general common law structure we have sketched 
involves a general principle that mere opinions are not 
actionable combined with a relatively broad range of 
exceptions to that principle. If it were generally true 
that statements involving opinions can be false only in a 
subjective sense—as Petitioners claim—then there would 
be only one exception, for opinions not sincerely held. 
But that is not the law. Rather, there are a number of 
exceptions that operate where the reasons for the general 
rule do not apply.
Those reasons are generally of three kinds: plaintiffs 
do not (or may not justifi ably) rely on opinion statements; 
opinion statements are understood as part of a normal 
“bargaining game”; and opinion statements are not 
provably false. Dobbs, supra, § 477, at 1365. The established 
exceptions, on the other hand, capture those situations 
when reliance on a statement of opinion is reasonable 
because of the relationship between the speaker and the 
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recipient, the speaker’s expertise or access to information, 
or the implication of underlying facts. 11
Congress intended the Securities Act to change 
the rules of the “bargaining game” and to make the 
statements included in registration materials worthy 
of reliance. Moreover, by imposing due diligence and 
disclosure obligations on issuers and associated persons, 
Congress fostered the strong implication that issuers’ 
statements rested on due investigation of the underlying 
facts. 
First, the conclusions expressed in registration 
statements imply the existence of underlying facts. 
Virginia Bankshares recognized that this was frequently 
true of statements in securities documents generally; 
it is certainly true of Omnicare’s broad but conclusory 
statement of legal compliance at issue here. The business 
judgment rule includes “a presumption that in making a 
business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis.” Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 
(Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 
(Del. 1984)). Corporate offi cers and directors, moreover, 
11.  See, e.g., 3 Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts 2658 
(1929):
[I]f a misstatement of opinion does not ordinarily 
amount to actionable fraud it cannot be because the 
statement is one of opinion merely, for misstatements 
of opinion may be actionable; but rather because it is 
unreasonable to place reliance on such statements 
unless made by one who has, or purports to have, 
expert knowledge or peculiar means of information not 
accessible to the other party; and that it is assumed 
that no reliance was placed on the statements unless 
made by such a person.
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have duties under state corporate law to supervise the 
corporation’s legal and regulatory compliance. See, e.g., 
In re Caremark, Inc. Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 
959 (Del. Ch. 1996).12 Readers of a registration statement 
thus may presume its statements, including statements 
about legal compliance, are informed by an adequate 
investigation of the facts and law.
Second, issuers of securities do stand in a relation of 
trust to prospective purchasers. Congress intended the 
1933 Act to hold issuers to “high standards of trusteeship.” 
H.R. Rep. No. 73-85 at 3 (1933); see also Shulman, supra, 
at 252 (observing that § 11 “has extended the reach of the 
duty . . . by denying “the defense available at common law 
that the defendant was under no duty to the plaintiff”). 
And as the United States points out in its brief, the 
statute itself adopts common law fi duciary obligations as 
the standard of reasonableness for the defenses in § 11(b)
(3). See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Vacatur and Remand, at 28 & n.5 (discussing 
15 U.S.C. § 77k(c)).13
12.  See also, e.g., Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate 
Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business 
Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 Bus. Law. 1237, 1241 (1986) 
(noting that “[u]nder corporate law . . . due care must be used in 
ascertaining relevant facts and law before making the decision”).
13.  See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 
U.S. 180, 195 (1963) (stating that under the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, which likewise involves a “fi duciary” standard of 
care, “it would be logical to conclude that Congress codifi ed 
the common law ‘remedially’ as the courts had adapted it to the 
prevention of fraudulent securities transactions by fi duciaries, not 
‘technically’ as it has traditionally been applied in damage suits 
between parties to arm’s-length transactions involving land and 
ordinary chattels”). 
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Third, the defendants in § 11 actions necessarily 
enjoy much broader access to information about the 
company than do prospective purchasers. That is why 
the Act imposes broad disclosure obligations on issuers. 
And people involved in the preparation of the registration 
statement include not only the company’s offi cers but also 
lawyers, auditors, and other fi nancial professionals with 
extensive expert knowledge. This is thus a paradigm case 
in which recipients of opinion statements are entitled to 
rely on expert opinion. As one court noted, “[t]he essential 
objective of securities legislation is to protect those who 
do not know market conditions from the overreachings 
of those who do.” Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 
434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943).
Finally, securities law incorporates principles, such 
as the good faith and due diligence defenses in § 11(b)(3), 
that afford breathing room to opinions about valuation, 
fairness, and other matters. These principles are bounded, 
however; they refute the notion that there is no such 
thing as an objective limit to opinions about securities 
matters. After all, Congress intended the securities laws 
to tighten the bounds of permissible salesmanship in the 
registration context. As the leading treatise puts it, “[t]he 
antifraud provisions are part of a statutory scheme that 
resulted from . . . a congressional determination that the 
public interest demanded legislation that would recognize 
the gross inequality of bargaining power between the 
professional securities fi rm and the average investor.” 
Loss, et. al., supra, at 434.
The common law background thus strongly suggests 
that Congress incorporated into the Securities Act the 
longstanding exceptions to the general rule that opinions 
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are non-actionable. And the continuing nuanced treatment 
of opinion statements in common law settings belies 
Petitioners’ categorical insistence that such statements 
may be false only if they are not subjectively believed. 
III. Statements of legal compliance are not matters of 
opinion in the same sense as other statements.
Much of the discussion in this case has equated 
statements of opinion in general with the statements of legal 
compliance at issue in this particular dispute. Statements 
about legal matters raise particular problems, however, 
and the law often treats them distinctly. Petitioners assert 
that “statements about legal compliance are by their very 
nature statements of opinion,” Petitioners’ Brief at 35 n.10, 
and that such statements “are necessarily infused with 
the issuer’s judgment as to uncertain future events,” id. 
at 33. Their categorical conclusion is that legal opinions 
are simply subjective predictions about unknowable future 
events: 
Legal compliance is undeniably a “matter of 
judgment.” A legal opinion given today could 
change or be rendered obsolete tomorrow. 
An assertion of legal compliance cannot be 
defi nitively true or false at the time it is made 
except in the rare case in which a court has 
already defi nitively ruled on the legality of 
the issuer’s actions. The ultimate accuracy of 
the stated belief hinges on future events and 
the decisions of judges, juries, and regulators. 
Assessing legal compliance thus calls for an 
exercise of judgment about unknowable future 
events. 
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Id. at 34-35. This is an extraordinary thing for lawyers 
to say about the law. It takes Justice Holmes’ famous 
assertion that law is simply “the prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact”14 and adds a proposition that Holmes 
rejected—that is, that what the courts will do is in fact 
no more predictable than, say, whether the stock market 
will go up or down.15
If Petitioners are right that legal opinions simply 
cannot be objectively false—that they can be false only if 
they misrepresent the speaker’s subjective belief—then 
it is unclear on what basis they can argue that the Sixth 
Circuit got the law wrong in this case. But Petitioners are 
not right. There are, to be sure, purely legal questions 
upon which the currently-existing legal materials do not 
provide a defi nitive answer, and there are also questions 
of the application of law to fact that inevitably involve the 
exercise of judgment. As scholars, amici endeavor to teach 
our classes in such a way as to identify both those areas 
where the law is settled and clear and those in which it 
is open to honest debate. But the existence of gray areas 
does not establish that gray is all there is. 
In this case, Respondents alleged that Petitioners’ 
statements that Omnicare was in compliance with 
applicable state and federal laws, and that in particular 
14.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. 
L. Rev. 457, 460-61 (1897).
15.  See id. at 461-62 (affi rming that “[w]hen we study law 
we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession” 
and expressing optimism that legal thought can “make these 
prophecies more precise, and . . . generalize them into a thoroughly 
connected system”).
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its relationships with pharmaceutical companies were 
legal and valid, were false because Omnicare was in 
fact providing illegal kickbacks to those companies. 
Petitioners’ statements of legal compliance might be 
understood as conveying one of three things: (1) that 
although kickbacks are illegal, Omnicare was not engaged 
in any version of that practice; (2) that although Omnicare 
was providing kickbacks, kickbacks are not illegal under 
the applicable law, or (3) that the relationships Omnicare 
had with pharmaceuticals did not amount to kickbacks. 
The fi rst sense would amount to a representation of fact, 
even though stated as a matter of legal compliance. As 
such, it would be actionable if objectively false in the same 
sense as non-legal opinions that imply the existence of 
particular facts.
The second understanding of Petitioners’ statements 
would be a pure statement about the content of the law, 
and the third a statement about the application of law to 
fact. Both (2) and (3) are opinions in the sense that they 
involve some degree of judgment. But the common law has 
long allowed reliance on such statements in circumstances 
analogous to those here. Moreover, doctrines throughout 
the law—from qualified immunity to Rule 11 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—differentiate between 
legal opinions that are within the zone of legitimate 
disagreement and those that fall outside it. 
Both the common law and the Securities Act provide 
specifi c tools to protect opinions on genuinely uncertain 
legal matters from incurring liability. But the law’s content 
and its application are often knowable and determinate, 
and in these cases lawyers and other actors are frequently 
held liable if they misinterpret or misstate its commands. 
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It is accordingly open to this Court to decide this case 
in terms of the proper treatment of legal opinions under 
the Securities Act, without necessarily assimilating those 
opinions to other sorts of opinions, such as judgments 
whether a price is “high” or a transaction is “fair.”
A. Statements of legal opinion often imply the 
existence of particular facts, misrepresentations 
of which may incur liability.
In tort, “the general rule is that, as between parties 
bearing no fiduciary relation to each other, a mere 
misrepresentation of law by one party, or a mere mistake 
of law by the other party, is no ground for relief.” Pieh v. 
Flitton, 211 N.W. 964 (Minn. 1927). But like all statements 
of opinion, statements of legal opinion may imply the 
existence of certain facts. The statement that “I was 
in legal compliance with the speed limit on my way to 
work this morning,” for example, would be understood 
as a statement of fact—that is, that the speaker was 
driving at a speed lower than the posted limit—rather 
than an opinion about the law, simply because the legal 
elements are both obvious and uncontested.16 If the other 
elements of a misrepresentation claim were met, the false 
implication of fact would be suffi cient to establish liability.
The common law of torts has long recognized that 
“[i]f a misrepresentation as to a matter of law includes, 
expressly or by implication, a misrepresentation of fact, the 
16.  The speaker would not ordinarily be understood to be 
saying, for instance, that he was in fact driving 100 mph but had 
a good faith belief that the posted speed limit was invalid under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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recipient is justifi ed in relying upon the misrepresentation 
of fact to the same extent as though it were any other 
misrepresentation of fact.” Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 545; see also Seeger v. Odell, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (Cal. 1941) 
(“If . . . the opinion or legal conclusion misrepresents the 
facts upon which it is based or implies the existence of 
facts which are nonexistent, it constitutes an actionable 
misrepresentation.”).17 This section treats statements of 
law as pure statements of opinion only “if all the pertinent 
facts are known and there is no misrepresentation of the 
existence or nonexistence of a pertinent statute or judicial 
decision.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 545 cmt. a. 
Courts acting in accord with this rule have held that when 
one party has special knowledge of the facts not available 
to the other, it will treat a statement of legal compliance 
as a representation of fact. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Gardner, 
334 P.2d 471, 474 (Or. 1959) (“This is not a case to which 
the maxim that ignorance of the law excuses no one can be 
applied. The plaintiffs are not relying on their ignorance 
of the law but of the facts, and the alleged representations 
carried with them the implication that the facts were 
otherwise than the evidence shows them to have been.”). 
Contract law applies an identical rule. See Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 170 cmt. b (acknowledging that a 
statement about the law “may, as may any other statement 
of opinion, carry with it the assertion that the facts known 
to the maker are not incompatible with his opinion, or that 
he does know facts that justify him in forming it”).
17.  See also Restatement of Torts § 545 (articulating an 
identical rule); Dobbs, supra, § 478, at 1368 (“Some statements 
of law may actually state or at least imply facts that are provably 
false and if so they are actionable on the same grounds as other 
factual statements.”).
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On the facts of this case, Omnicare’s statement that it 
was in legal compliance implied that it was not engaged in 
any practices that would plainly be illegal. The registration 
statement did not go into detail concerning Omnicare’s 
relationships with pharmaceutical companies; it did not, 
in terms of the common law rule, provide a factual basis 
upon which the recipient of its statement could draw its 
own legal conclusions. This brings Omnicare within the 
rule of Restatement § 545—that is, it is liable if the facts 
implied by its representation of legality turn out to be 
objectively untrue.
B. Statements about the content or application 
of the law itself may be actionable under the 
common law, and they may be objectively false 
if they fall outside the bound of legitimate 
disagreement.
The general rule treating statements of law as 
non-actionable opinions applies more readily where the 
representation refl ects a judgment about the content of 
the law or the proper application of that law to particular 
facts. That rule is not without exception, however; in fact, 
§ 545 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes clear 
that “[i]f a misrepresentation as to a matter of law is only 
one of opinion as to the legal consequences of facts, the 
recipient is justifi ed in relying upon it to the same extent 
as though it were a representation of any other opinion.” 
Hence “[i]t is not universally true that a misrepresentation 
of the law is not binding upon the party who made it. . . 
. Where one who has had superior means of information 
professes a knowledge of the law, and thereby obtains an 
unconscionable advantage of another who is ignorant and 
has not been in a situation to become informed, the injured 
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party is entitled to relief as well as if the misrepresentation 
had been concerning matter of fact.” Rusch v. Wald, 232 
N.W. 875, 876 (Wis. 1930) (quoting 1 Melville M. Bigelow, 
A Treatise on the Law of Fraud on Its Civil Side 488 
(1888)). Likewise, the general exceptions for speakers who 
stand in special relationships of trust to the recipient apply 
likewise to statements of law. See Bigelow, supra, at 488.
Moreover, the common law of torts imposes special 
obligations on lawyers. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts cites Sainsbury v. Pennsylvania Greyhound 
Lines, Inc., 183 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1950), which noted that 
“[t]he rule is also well established that when a lawyer 
makes a misrepresentation of law to a layman relief may 
be afforded, even though the layman knows the lawyer 
represents an antagonistic interest. Any other rule would 
be unconscionable.” Id. at 550-51 (citing Rusch, 232 N.W. 
at 876, and Restatement of Torts § 545 cmt. d (1938)).18 
When a stock registration statement, often written by 
and certainly reviewed by lawyers, purports to offer 
a judgment on the legality of the issuing company’s 
activities, laypersons are entitled to rely on that judgment.
Contract law likewise does not distinguish in principle 
between misstatements of fact and misstatements of law. 
Section 170 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
which is based on § 545 of the Restatement (Second) 
18.  See also Dobbs, supra, § 478, at 1368 (“If false and 
uttered by a lawyer as an expert, [statements of opinions about 
legal consequences of a given action] may be actionable as false 
statements of fact because they imply that the lawyer both holds 
the opinion and has a basis for it; uttered by a layman who has no 
special knowledge or fi duciary obligation it is probably protected 
as opinion.”) (emphasis added).
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of Torts, maintains that “[i]f an assertion is one as to a 
matter of law, the same rules that apply in the case of other 
assertions determine whether the recipient is justifi ed 
in relying on it.” Contract law, like tort law, imposes 
special obligations on lawyers and persons purporting to 
apply legal expertise. See id. cmt. b (“[I]f the maker of 
the representation purports to have special expertise in 
the law which the recipient does not have, reliance on the 
opinion may be justifi ed (§ 167(b)). If a lawyer states his 
opinion of law to a layman, the layman is entitled to assume 
his professional honesty and may justifi ably rely on his 
opinion even though the two have an adverse relation in 
negotiating a contract. Even if the maker is not a lawyer, 
he may purport to have special knowledge that will enable 
him to form a reliable opinion. . . .”).
Courts have been skeptical, moreover, of the 
proposition that statements of legal compliance amount 
to statements of opinion at all, at least in ordinary 
circumstances. In Municipal Metallic Bed Mfg. Corp. v. 
Dobbs, 171 N.E. 75 (N.Y. 1930), for example, the New York 
Court of Appeals held that a tenant could sue based on a 
landlord’s misrepresentation that manufacturing was a 
lawful use of the property. In that case, the court wrote, 
“we have something more than a representation of law 
which is to be taken as the expression of an opinion only. 
The landlords assume to guarantee that their building 
may lawfully be used for the purposes for which it was 
leased. If any presumption exists, it is that the landlord 
knows whether his building complies with the zoning laws 
and factory regulations. The tenant is not left to his own 
judgment, but may rely on the contract of the landlord.” Id. 
at 76. The same court later read this opinion to exemplify 
“a sharp distinction between a pure opinion of law which 
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may not, except in unusual circumstances, base an action 
in tort, and a mixed statement of fact as to what the law 
is or whether it is applicable.” Nat’l Conversion Corp. v. 
Cedar Building Corp., 246 N.E.2d 351, 355 (N.Y. 1969); 
see also Crowther v. Guidone, 441 A.2d 11, 13 (Conn. 
1981) (“To require the representation to be made as a 
statement of fact . . . is quite different than to require that 
the statement be factual as opposed to legal.”). 
This skepticism makes sense, because in many 
instances a statement about the content of the law or its 
application to particular facts is not a matter of legitimate 
dispute. The statement “the speed limit on that highway is 
55 miles per hour” is a statement of fact notwithstanding 
that it concerns the content of the law. Likewise, the 
statement that “the police’s warrantless use of thermal 
imaging to look inside a private residence is unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment” is not simply a statement 
of opinion, because this Court has settled that question. 
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Before 
Kyllo, however, the same statement might well have been 
properly viewed as a matter of opinion. The extent to which 
statements of law should be treated as opinion or fact 
depends largely on how settled the law and its applications 
are in particular areas. 
Contrary to Petitioners’ suggestion, the law does not 
simply throw up its hands in the face of some degree of 
legal indeterminacy and treat all legal questions as open 
to dispute. The jurisprudence of qualifi ed immunity, for 
example, demonstrates the law’s ability to distinguish 
between legitimate legal uncertainty and “clearly 
established law.” See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 800, 817 (1982). Likewise, courts impose sanctions 
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on attorneys for failing to cite controlling adverse 
precedent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 notwithstanding that 
“attorneys are legitimately entitled to press their own 
interpretations of precedent, including interpretations 
which render particular cases inapplicable”; sanctions are 
justifi ed when these efforts pass the bounds of legitimate 
argument. Jorgenson v. Cty. of Volusia, 846 F.2d 1350, 
1352 (11th Cir. 1988). And Congress has instructed federal 
courts entertaining habeas corpus petitions to identify 
state court decisions that “involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 
(2000) (clarifying that the inquiry is whether the state 
court’s decision was “objectively unreasonable”). Each of 
these standards requires the courts to respect an area of 
legitimate disagreement—one in which lawyers may hold 
differing opinions about the content or the application of 
the law—but also to police its outer boundaries.
 This Court currently has before it a case involving 
whether a police offi cer may base “reasonable suspicion” 
upon a mistake of law. See Heien v. North Carolina, No. 
13-604. Amici express no view on the proper resolution 
of that case. We note, however, that even North Carolina 
concedes both that the reasonableness of the offi cer’s 
mistake is an objective question and that mistakes of law 
should be excused only within narrow bounds. See Brief 
for the Respondent at 16-17, Heien v. North Carolina, No. 
13-604 (July 2014). North Carolina does not maintain that 
legal judgments are simply matters of opinion. Judgments 
about the law can be true, false, or sometimes uncertain, 
and all across the law—from tort to contract to qualifi ed 
immunity to habeas—courts manage to tell the difference. 
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C. The securities laws contain ample mechanisms 
for protecting legal opinions on legitimately 
contested questions.
The examples given show that courts can determine 
the existence and boundaries of legitimate legal 
disagreement. Those examples should not, of course, 
determine the proper standard for assessing such 
disagreement under the securities laws. Qualified 
immunity jurisprudence is quite protective of defendants’ 
erroneous legal judgments for very good reasons: the 
defendants generally are not lawyers; they must make 
on-the-spot legal judgments under diffi cult conditions; and 
the costs of over-deterrence are high. Likewise, Rule 11 
applies a gentle standard in order to encourage vigorous 
advocacy, and § 2254(d) shields state courts’ applications 
of law to fact for federalism reasons. 
Section 11 of the Securities Act, however, exists at 
the opposite end of the spectrum from these examples. 
It applies only to statements included in the registration 
statement—a highly formal document painstakingly 
prepared and reviewed by numerous professionals, 
including skilled attorneys. As already discussed, 
Congress intended to impose a strong obligation of 
due diligence in the preparation of these statements; 
hence the imposition of strict liability for erroneous or 
misleading statements in the registration materials. 
And state corporate law imposes additional obligations 
of investigation and oversight. The reasons for according 
relatively broad leeway for erroneous legal judgments by, 
say, a cop on the beat do not apply here.
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Section 11 also has a built-in mechanism for shielding 
persons other than the issuer itself from liability based 
on good-faith judgments about uncertain questions of law. 
Section 11(b)(3) provides a complete defense to liability 
for persons who, “after reasonable investigation, have 
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time 
such part of the registration statement became effective, 
that the statements therein were true.” See also Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 & n.26 (1976).
This Court need not determine the precise degree 
of uncertainty necessary to render a statement of 
legal compliance a non-falsifi able opinion under § 11. 
Petitioners moved to dismiss on the ground that failure 
to allege Omnicare’s statements of legal compliance were 
subjectively false disposed of Respondents’ claims. See 
Respondents’ Brief at 56-58. That is plainly incorrect. The 
parties have not yet litigated whether the legal compliance 
issues presented by this particular case fall within a 
zone of legal ambiguity such that Omnicare’s statements 
amounted to pure opinion. Nor have they litigated whether 
Omnicare’s statements implied certain underlying facts 
or fell into one of the other well-recognized categories 
in which even opinion statements are actionable. It 
is sufficient to resolve this appeal that, contrary to 
Petitioners’ view, statements of legal compliance may 
involve assertions that are objectively falsifi able.
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CONCLUSION
The court of appeals’ judgment should be affi rmed.
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